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Abstract
In two-party quantum communication complexity, Alice and Bob receive some classical inputs and wish
to compute some function that depends on both these inputs, while minimizing the communication. This
model has found numerous applications in many areas of computer science. One question that has received
a lot of attention recently is whether it is possible to perform such protocols in a private way. We show
that defining privacy for quantum protocols is not so straightforward and it depends on whether we assume
that the registers where Alice and Bob receive their classical inputs are in fact classical registers (and hence
unentangled with the rest of the protocol) or quantum registers (and hence can be entangled with the rest
of the protocol or the environment). We provide new quantum protocols for the Inner Product function
and for Private Information Retrieval, and show that the privacy assuming classical input registers can be
exponentially smaller than the privacy assuming quantum input registers. We also argue that the right
notion of privacy of a communication protocol is the one assuming classical input registers, since otherwise
the players can deviate considerably from the protocol.
1 Introduction
In two-party communication complexity [Y79], Alice and Bob receive inputs x and y and wish to compute
some function that depends on both these inputs, while minimizing the communication. This model has found
numerous applications in many areas of computer science. One question that has received a lot of attention
recently is whether it is possible to perform such protocols in a private way.
In classical communication protocols, the privacy loss (or information cost) is defined as the information
that the transcript reveals to each player about the input of the other one. In this model, one is interested in
the privacy loss of a specific protocol and hence we only consider the case where the players honestly follow
the protocol and not how they can increase the information by deviating from the protocol.
In quantum communication protocols [Y93], Alice and Bob receive classical inputs x and y and wish to
compute a function f(x, y). We consider three quantum registersA,M,B that correspond to Alice’s workspace,
the message qubits, and Bob’s workspace. At each round of the protocol, one player applies a unitary operation
on his workspace and the message qubits, and sends the message qubits to the other player who continues the
protocol. Since the message qubits can be reused throughout the protocol and copying of the quantum states
may be impossible, we cannot define a transcript. Hence, we know of no way to define notions of privacy or
quantum information cost, other than by a round-by-round definition.
It is not hard to see, by a chain rule argument, that the classical definition of privacy loss is equivalent to a
round-by-round definition where for every round k, we calculate the information that the message at round k
reveals about the sender’s input to the receiver, who knows his input and has kept a copy of all previous
messages in his workspace.
Again, this definition is not readily applicable to quantum protocols, since the players may not be able to
copy the messages and continue the protocol at the same time. Nevertheless, they have a quantum workspace,
where, depending on the protocol, they may keep information about previous messages. We would like to
calculate how much information every new message reveals to them, given that they already know their own
input and have kept some information in their quantum workspace according to the protocol.
There is one additional important issue to consider. Each player has a register where the input is written
in the beginning of the protocol. This input is always a classical input. One natural possibility is therefore
to consider that the input register is a classical register, meaning it cannot be entangled with the workspaces
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and the message space. The second possibility is to consider that the input is written in a quantum register,
which could be entangled with the players’ workspaces or even with the environment. We discuss below in
more details these two possibilities (formal definitions and more complete discussion is given in Section 3).
Privacy for quantum protocols with classical input registers. Privacy with classical input registers has
previously been discussed for some classes of quantum protocols, for example in [K02, LG12]. In particular,
Klauck defined a notion of honest behaviour of the players, according to which, at every round of the protocol,
the state of the message qubits sent must be equal to the one prescribed by the protocol. He, then, considered
the privacy of Disjointness by looking at a quantum protocol with pure state messages. However, when applied
to protocols with mixed state messages, his definition allows for a player to change the execution of the protocol
considerably. Hence, in this paper we propose a definition of honest execution of a protocol that takes into
consideration protocols in which the players can send mixed states, and is equivalent to Klauck’s definition
for pure state protocols. We then define Alice’s and Bob’s privacy loss for a protocol π, and denote these
quantities by LA(π) and LB(π), respectively.
Privacy for quantum protocols with quantum input registers. There have been definitions of quantum
information cost where the input registers are considered to be quantum registers that can hold superpositions
of inputs and be entangled with other registers ([CS14, JRS03, BB14, T14]). This is the case for example
with the ”superposed” information cost for a protocol π. We denote it (see Definition 4) by SICA(π), where
Bob is allowed to have in his input register a superposition of all his possible inputs (corresponding to the
input distribution) instead of the fixed classical input y he received, and he is allowed to measure this register
in the computational basis at any moment during the execution of π. While this is certainly a strategy that
Bob can follow in order to acquire more information about Alice’s input, as we said before, we are not in
a cryptographic scenario with cheating players, rather we want to compute the privacy loss of the specific
protocol that computes the function. Also note that if Bob starts with a superposition of all possible inputs,
Alice and Bob are not able to compute the value of the function f on the received inputs (x, y), but only on a
point (x, y′) for a random y′. Bob’s superposed information cost, denoted SICB(π), is defined in a symmetric
way. Recently, another definition of quantum information cost for quantum protocols, denoted in this paper
by QICA(π) and QICB(π), was proposed by Touchette [T14]. This definition has nice properties, e.g., it is
equal to the amortized quantum communication complexity [T14]. In this case, the input registers are initially
entangled with an external register (an environment, not accessible to the players). Note that the quantum
information cost does not compute the information a message reveals about a player’s input (as in the usual
notion of privacy) but about the environment register.
Our results The main goal of this paper is to investigate quantum communication complexity under these
different variants of privacy, and in particular study the differences between privacy with classical input registers
and privacy with quantum input registers. In the present work, we first prove the following inequalities between
these definitions.
Result 1: LA(π) ≤ SICA(π) ≤ QICA(π) and LB(π) ≤ SICB(π) ≤ QICB(π).
We then show that, in some cases, the gaps can be exponentially large. This is done by considering the
privacy of fundamental tasks such as Private Information Retrieval and the Inner Product function. In order
to obtain these gaps, one of the main contributions of this paper is the construction of protocols for these tasks
with small privacy loss (i.e., in the setting where the input registers are classical).
We believe that constructing quantum protocols with small privacy loss gives new insight about the relation
between privacy and quantum information. In particular, we believe that the notions of superposed and
quantum information cost are much more suited as tools in order to lower bound the communication complexity
than as tools to measure the privacy of the communication protocol under consideration. Note that for SIC,
the parties can indeed, as mentioned above, considerably deviate from the protocol and may not even compute
the function f on the received inputs; for QIC we do not measure the information revealed about each player’s
input but about the register R. In comparison, privacy loss with classical input registers appears to be more
suited as a tool to discuss the privacy of a specific protocol computing a function with classical inputs. Notice
also that in the classical case, if we allow Alice to run the protocol with a random input instead of the input x
she received, then private protocols, like for the IdMinimum function (where the output is min(x, y) together
with the identity of the player who has this value) are rendered not private.
We describe below in more details our results for the Inner Product function and for Private Information
Retrieval.
The privacy of Inner Product. We prove a simple gap between quantum communication complexity and
privacy loss.
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Result 2: There exists a quantum protocol for Inner Product, which is perfectly private for Bob and where
Alice’s privacy loss is only n/2 + 1/2.
We also show that for the protocol we contruct the superposed and quantum information cost is basically
n/2 for both parties, hence providing a gap between these notions.
The privacy of Private Information Retrieval. Private Information Retrieval has been extensively studied
so as to find the minimum communication necessary between the user and one or more servers, while keeping
the perfect privacy of the user. Here we consider the one-server setting: the server has for input a database
x = x1 · · ·xn ∈ {0, 1}n, the user has for input an index i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and the goal is for the user to output xi.
It is well known that any classical protocol perfectly private for the user (i.e., in which the server obtains no
information about i) requires Ω(n) bits of communication [CGKS98]. Moreover, the quantum communication
complexity, as well as the superposed and quantum information costs are also Ω(n) [JRS09].
Recently, Le Gall [LG12] showed that there exists a quantum protocol for this task, perfectly private for
the user (according to Definition 3), with communication complexity O(
√
n). This upper bound has then be
improved to O(n1/3) by Ruben Brokkelkamp [RB13]. Here we ask the question: Can these upper bounds
be further improved? Or, more generally, how much information does a single server have to leak about the
database in any protocol which is perfectly private for the user? We show the following surprising result.
Result 3: There exists a quantum protocol for Private Information Retrieval, which is perfectly private for
the user and in which the server’s privacy loss is polylogarithmic on the size of the database. Moreover its
communication complexity is also polylogarithmic on the size of the database.
This provides the first exponential separation between the different notions of privacy of quantum protocols
(namely, privacy loss versus superposed and quantum information costs).
The proof has two steps: first, we show how to take any ℓ-server classical PIR scheme and translate it into
a quantum one-server scheme, such that the index remains perfectly private. Then, we use a classical PIR
scheme with a logarithmic number of servers and polylogarithmic communication [CGKS98], which implies
that the privacy loss about the database is polylogarithmic, since it is always less than the communication.
Finally, we improve the above upper bounds when the user and the server share prior entanglement: we
construct a new quantum protocol for Private Information Retrieval, perfectly private for the user, where the
server’s privacy loss is O(log n) bits. The communication complexity of this protocol is O(log n), which is
optimal since, even with prior entanglement, the quantum communication complexity of the Index Function
is Ω(log n).
2 Preliminaries
In this paper we write, for a positive integer p, [p] := {1, 2, . . . , p} and, for two positive integer p < q, write
[p, q] := {p, p+ 1, . . . , q}.
In two-party communication complexity, Alice and Bob receive inputs x and y respectively and wish to
compute some function f(x, y) that depends on both these inputs, while minimizing the communication cost,
i.e., the number of exchanged bits. The communication complexity of a function is the least amount of com-
munication possible in a protocol computing f . We refer to [KN97] for details about classical communication
complexity, and to [BNSW98] for asymmetric communication complexity.
In two-party quantum communication complexity, the players are now allowed to exchange quantum bits.
The standard model consists of three quantum registers: A, M and B. Here A and B are private workspaces
of Alice and Bob respectively, while M is used to communicate qubits and is sent from one player to the other
one. Additionally, Alice and Bob hold a register (classical or quantum), say X and Y respectively, where they
store their respective input. At every round, one player applies a unitary operation on their workspace and
the message qubits (that also depends on their input) and sends the message qubits to the other player who
continues the protocol.
In the above setting, the Inner Product (IP) problem consists in computing f(x, y) = x · y :=∑i xi · yi. In
[CG88], it is proved as a particular case of the bounded error setting, that computing classically and perfectly
IP requires a communication of n, and the same holds for quantum protocols [CDNT99].
Another well studied problem is Private Information Retrieval (PIR): a user, whose input is an index
i ∈ [n], interacts with a server holding a database x = (xj)j∈[n] ∈ {0, 1}n. The goal for the user is to learn
xi in such way that the server does not learn his index, i. In [CGKS95, CGKS98], it is shown that the
communication complexity of this problem is Ω(n). The same paper also shows that it is possible to improve
the communication complexity if the user can interact with several independent servers: in this setting it is
possible to obtain a communication polylogarithmic in n. In [LG12], the author gives a quantum protocol using
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a single server and only O(
√
n) qubits of communication, which yields a quadratic improvement over what is
possible classically. This upper bound has then be improved to O(n1/3) by Ruben Brokkelkamp [RB13]. In
both cases the protocol is perfectly private for the user (as long as the server follows exactly the prescribed
scheme). If we allow the players to create superpositions of inputs or act as specious adversaries, then it is
known that the communication from the server must be linear [JRS09, BB14].
The privacy will be analyzed with information theoretical tools. More precisely, S(X) will denote the
entropy of X , that is S(X) is equal to −∑x px log(px) if X is a classical random variable taking value x with
probability px, or to −Tr(ρX log(ρX)) if X is quantum register whose state is denoted by ρX . If A,B and C
are either classical random variables or quantum registers, the mutual information between A and B (resp.
the mutual information between A and B conditioned on C) is defined by I(A : B) = S(A) + S(B)− S(AB)
(resp. I(A : B|C) = I(AC : B)− I(C : B) = S(AC) + S(BC)− S(C)− S(ABC), which can be interpreted as
the knowledge that A gives about B provided that we already knew C).
3 Definitions of privacy for quantum protocols and their relation
In classical communication protocols, the privacy loss is defined as the information that the transcript of the
communication reveals to each player about the input of the other one. Using a chain rule argument, it is not
hard to see that the classical definition of privacy loss is equivalent to a round-by-round definition where for
every round k, we calculate the information that the message at round k reveals about each player’s input to
the other player, who already knows his input and has kept a copy of all previous messages in his workspace:
I(Π : X |Y ) =
∑
k: odd
I(Mk : X |Y,M1, . . . ,Mk−1),
I(Π : Y |X) =
∑
k: even
I(Mk : Y |X,M1, . . . ,Mk−1).
Note that we define the privacy loss of each player separately, since their input sizes or their privacy
considerations can be different. For example, for Private Information Retrieval, we will look at protocols which
are perfectly secure for the user (whose input has size logn) and leaks a logarithmic amount of information
about the database (whose size is n). Moreover, we do not condition on the value of the function that each
player computes, since as we will see in the quantum setting, the protocol may not compute the function.
In quantum communication protocols, since there is no notion of transcript, we define notions of privacy
or quantum information cost by a round-by-round definition. As we said, we will also differentiate between the
case where the input registers are classical or quantum.
3.1 Privacy for quantum protocols with a classical input register
Let us first assume that the input registers of the two players are classical. We start by describing Klauck’s
definition of an honest quantum protocol.
Definition 1 ([K02]). A protocol is honest if both players are honest. A player is honest if for all rounds of
the protocol, for all inputs he may have and for all sequences of pure state messages he may have received in
the previous rounds, the density matrix of the message in the next round equals the density matrix defined by
the protocol and the input. The behavior of the player on mixed states is defined by his behavior on pure state
messages.
Klauck used this definition for a protocol where all messages were pure states. Nevertheless, in a run of a
general protocol the player might actually receive mixed state messages.
Let us consider the following simple 2-round scheme where the players use only two registers, (Q,R):
1. Alice prepares |φ〉 = 12 (|0〉Q|0〉R + |1〉Q|1〉R) and sends register R to Bob.
2. Bob sends back register R (without doing anything).
In this situation, we would expect that Bob should not be able to save a copy of register R before returning it,
since in that case, while according to the protocol Alice should have had the pure state |φ〉 at the end of the
two rounds, when Bob copies the register R, she ends up with an equal mixture of the states |0〉|0〉 and |1〉|1〉.
Nevertheless, according to Klauck’s definition, Bob’s behaviour is permissible. Indeed, Bob receives a uniform
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mixture of the pure states |0〉 and |1〉 and for each one of the pure states, Bob can in fact copy the state and
then return the register R to Alice. While for each pure state, his behaviour is according to the protocol, in
fact his overall behaviour is not!
We hence propose a different definition, more adept for protocols with mixed state messages, which coincides
with Klauck’s definition when messages are pure.
Definition 2. Let π be a quantum protocol where, at each round k, the quantum registers corresponding to
the message sent, Alice’s workspace and Bob’s workspace are denoted Mk, Ak and Bk, respectively. An honest
execution of the protocol is such that for all k, the joint state in the registers Ak,Mk, Bk is equal to the state
described by the protocol, up to a possible local operation on Ak and a possible local operation on Bk.
We can now provide the definition of privacy loss
Definition 3. For a protocol π, the privacy loss of Alice and Bob are defined as
LA(π) =
∑
k : odd
I(Mk : X |Y,Bk) and LB(π) =
∑
k : even
I(Mk : Y |X,Ak),
where X,Y are classical registers that hold the inputs according to the input distribution, and Mk, Ak, Bk are
quantum registers that correspond to the message qubits and Alice’s and Bob’s workspaces at round k.
It is easy to see that the privacy loss for any honest execution of the protocol is the same, hence we only
need to consider the states described by the protocol itself. Also, if according to the protocol Alice holds a
pure state at some round, then an honest Bob can not entangle his workspace with Alice’s state. Last if π
computes some function f , then any honest execution also computes f . This is important, since as in the
classical case, it makes sense to consider only the privacy of protocols that actually compute the function f .
3.2 Privacy for quantum protocols with a quantum input register
In the previous definition we considered X and Y to be classical registers. There have been definitions of
quantum information cost where the registers X and Y are considered to be quantum registers that can hold
superpositions of inputs and be entangled with other registers (e.g., [CS14, JRS03, BB14, T14]).
For example we can introduce the ”superposed” information cost for a protocol π. The definition we
provide here is somewhat different from the one of [CS14], in order to make the comparison between the
different notions of privacy more direct. In spirit, the idea of the ”superposed” information cost is to allow one
player to run the protocol with a superposition of inputs instead of the classical input she or he has received
according to the input distribution.
Definition 4. For a protocol π, the superposed information cost of Alice and Bob are defined respectively by
SICA(π) =
∑
k : odd
I(Mk : X |Y,Bk) and SICB(π) =
∑
k : even
I(Mk : Y |X,Ak),
where for Alice’s privacy loss, Alice follows the protocol π with her classical input in register X and Bob creates
a superposition of his inputs in register Y which he can measure in the computational basis at any round ; and
similarly for Bob.
Note that, in the case of a product input distribution, this is certainly a strategy that Bob could follow in
order to acquire more information about Alice’s input, but as we said before, we are not in a cryptographic
scenario with cheating players. Also note that if Bob has a superposition of all possible inputs, Alice and Bob
are not able to compute the value of the function f on the received inputs (x, y), but only on a point (x, y′)
for a random y′.
Recently, another definition of quantum information cost for protocols with entanglement was proposed by
Touchette [T14]. This definition has very nice properties, for example, it is equal to the amortized quantum
communication complexity. In this case, the registers X and Y are initially entangled with a register R (an
environment, not accessible to the players) so that the initial input state of the players for a distribution
µ is
∑
x,y µ(x, y)|x, y〉R|x〉X |y〉Y . Even though the registers X and Y contain a mixture of classical inputs,
nevertheless these registers are entangled with the register R, which is in fact what appears in the definition
of Touchette’s information cost. In other words, we are counting the information the message reveals about
the register R and not the player’s input register. For simplicity, we provide a variant of his definition for
protocols without prior entanglement.
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Definition 5. For a protocol π, the Quantum Information Cost of Alice and Bob are defined as
QICA(π) =
∑
k : odd
I(Mk : R|Y,Bk) and QICB(π) =
∑
k : even
I(Mk : R|X,Ak),
where the register R holds a purification of the registers X,Y and initially the registers A and B are equal to
|0〉.
3.3 Relation between the different definitions of privacy
We have seen three different definitions which measure in some way the information transmitted during the
protocol. We believe that the notions of superposed and quantum information cost are much more suited
as tools in order to lower bound the communication complexity than as tools to measure the privacy of the
communication protocol under consideration (the parties can indeed, as mentioned above, considerably deviate
from the protocol and may not even compute the function f on the received inputs). In comparison, privacy
with a classical register appears to be more suited to discuss the privacy of a protocol computing a function
with classical inputs; nevertheless it is a weaker lower bound for communication.
Notice also that in the classical case, if we allow Alice to run the protocol with a random input instead of
the x she received, then private protocols can be rendered not private. For example, the function IdMinimum,
where Alice and Bob must output the identity of the party that holds the minimum of two numbers and its
value, can be computed perfectly privately. Indeed, the protocol where at each round k = 1 . . . 2n the players
stop if one of them has input k, reveals no more than the output of the IdMinimum function. However, when
Alice picks a random input and runs the protocol, the protocol is no longer private for Bob since he reveals
his input with probability 1/2.
We now prove a general inequality between these three notions of privacy
Theorem 1. For any protocol π we have
LA(π) ≤ SICA(π) ≤ QICA(π) and LB(π) ≤ SICB(π) ≤ QICB(π).
Proof. The inequalities L(π) ≤ SIC(π) are by definition since for the superposed information cost, we allow
the players to measure their input at any point during the protocol, and hence they can do it at the beginning
and run the protocol with a classical input.
For SIC(π) ≤ QIC(π), we define the following state for any round of any protocol
1
2n
∑
x,y
|x〉XR |y〉YR |x〉X |y〉Y |φxy〉AMB .
This state corresponds to the joint state when consideringQIC, whereXRYR = R is the environment’s register.
It is also a purification of the state when considering, for example SICA, where now, XR is the register of the
environment, while Bob has both registers YRY . We can, indeed, assume that Bob creates a superposition of
his inputs in register Y and appends an extra register YR, where he copies each classical input via a CNOT
operation. Let us assume that Bob does not measure until the end of the protocol. Then, at round k,
I(Mk : X |Y YRBk) = I(Mk : XYR|Y Bk)− I(Mk : YR|Y Bk)
≤ I(Mk : XYR|Y Bk) = I(Mk : XRYR|Y Bk)
Summing over odd k we obtain SICA(π) ≤ QICA(π).
Now, imagine Bob measures after round ℓ, which is equivalent to tracing out YR (or giving it back to the
environment). We can prove as above that
∑ℓ
k=1 I(Mk : X |Y,Bk) ≤
∑ℓ
k=1 I(Mk : R|Y,Bk) and after the
measurement, the state is the same as the one in the privacy loss, which for any round k′ > ℓ is smaller that
the quantum information cost:
I(Mk′ : X |Y Bk′) = I(Mk′ : XYR|Y Bk′)− I(Mk′ : YR|XYBk′) ≤ I(Mk′ : XRYR|Y Bk′).
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4 Privacy for Inner Product
In this section we describe a quantum protocol for Inner Product and compute all different privacy quantities
for it.
The protocol is given in Fig. 1. Here we assume that only Alice needs to learn the value of the function
(then she could communicate it to Bob, leaking at most one bit of information about her input).
Protocol ΠIP
1. Alice creates and sends to Bob the state |φ1xy〉 := 1√2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n |r〉Q|r ·
x〉R
2. Bob applies the unitary Vy : |r〉 7→ |r ⊕ y〉 to register Q and sends back
to Alice the state |φ2xy〉 := 1√2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n |r ⊕ y〉Q|r · x〉R
Figure 1: Quantum protocol for inner product.
Let us prove the correctness of the protocol. Observe that
|φ2xy〉 =
1√
2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r ⊕ y〉Q|r · x〉R = 1√
2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r〉Q|(r ⊕ y) · x〉R.
At the end of the protocol, Alice, by applying the unitary Ux : |r〉|b〉 7→ |r〉|b ⊕ r · x〉, can transform |φ2xy〉 to
the state
|φ3xy〉 :=
1√
2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r〉Q|((r ⊕ y) · x)⊕ (r · x)〉R =

 1√
2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r〉Q

 |x · y〉R.
By measuring Register R, Alice obtains the bit x · y.
Assuming the inputs are distributed uniformly, we then evaluate the privacy of this protocol.
Theorem 2. For the above protocol ΠIP under uniform distribution of inputs, we have
LA(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 1/2 , LB(ΠIP ) = 1.
SICA(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 1/2 , SICB(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 1/2.
QICA(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 1/2 , QICB(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 3/2.
The proof of Theorem 2 is given below. Note that, since Alice must output x · y, the quantity LB is a
least one for any protocol computing Inner Product, which means that our protocol is optimal with respect
to this quantity. Also note that the lower bound of Cleve et al. [CDNT99] on the quantum communication
complexity of Inner Product shows that the sum of the privacy loss or information cost of both players is at
least n/2.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is split into two claims, which we prove one by one.
Claim 1. Bob gets n/2 + 1/2 bits of information from the first message and Alice one bit form the second
message. More precisely: LA(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 1/2 and LB(ΠIP ) = 1.
Proof. After receiving the first message, the information that Bob has about Alice’s input is, by definition:
I(M1 : X |Y ) = S(M1|Y )− S(Y )− S(XYM1) + S(XY ) = S(M1),
since S(XYM1) = S(XY ) = 2n and M1 is independent of Y . It remains to calculate S(M1). Define
Mx1 =|φ1xy〉〈φ1xy | =
1
2n
∑
r,r′
|r〉|r · x〉〈r′|〈r′ · x|.
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Then
M1 =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
1
2n
Mx1 =
1
22n
∑
r,r′
c(r, r′, i, j)|r〉|i〉〈r′|〈j|,
where the coefficient c(r, r′, i, j) is defined on {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n for i, j ∈ {0, 1} as:
c(r, r′, i, j) := #
{
x ∈ {0, 1}n : r · x = i, r′ · x = j
}
=


2n if r = r′ = i = j = 0
0 if r = r′, i 6= j
or r = 0, i = 1 or r′ = 0, j = 1
2n−1 if r = r′ 6= 0, i = j
or r = 0 6= r′, i = 0
or r′ = 0 6= r, j = 0
2n−2 otherwise.
We can show by computing the matrix and its eigenvalues that S(M1) = n/2+1/2 (up to exponentially small
terms).
Alice receives only one message from Bob, and after this message she has the state ρ2x,y =
1
22n
∑
x,y |x〉〈x|⊗
|φ2xy〉〈φ2xy| with
|φ2xy〉 =
1√
2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r〉|(r ⊕ y) · x〉.
We have
I(M2 : Y |X) = S(M2X)− S(X)− S(M2XY ) + S(SY )
= (n+ 1)− n+ 2n− 2n
= 1,
where we used the fact that the state in the registers M2X has the same entropy as the following state (since
there is a unitary on M2X that turns one into the other): ρ
3
x,y =
1
22n
∑
x,y |x〉〈x| ⊗ |φ3xy〉〈φ3xy | with
|φ3xy〉 =

 1√
2n
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r〉

 |x · y〉.
Claim 2. For the Superposed and Quantum Information Cost of the protocol, we have
SICA(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 1/2 , SICB(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 1/2.
QICA(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 1/2 , QICB(ΠIP ) = n/2 + 3/2.
Proof. We start with SICA(ΠIP ). In fact, this is equal to LA since the information Alice leaks in the first
message does not depend on whether Bob has a classical input or a superposition of inputs.
Let us compute SICB(ΠIP ): Alice uses a uniform superposition of her inputs in register X . In the
beginning, she creates
1
2n
∑
x
|x〉
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r〉|r · x〉.
Since Bob follows the protocol with a classical input y, Alice holds after Round 2 the state ρ2 = 12n
∑
y |φ2y〉〈φ2y |,
with |φ2y〉 = 12n
∑
x |x〉
∑
r∈{0,1}n |r〉|(r ⊕ y) · x〉. Then, we can calculate
I(M2 : Y |X) = S(M2X)− S(X)− S(M2XY ) + S(XY )
= (n/2 + 1/2)− (n/2 + 1/2)− n+ (n+ n/2 + 1/2)
= n/2 + 1/2.
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Now let us compute QICA(ΠIP ). For the first round, the state is
|φ1〉 = 1
23n/2
∑
xy
|x〉X |y〉Y |xy〉R
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r〉|r · x〉.
Then, we have
I(M1 : R|Y ) = S(M1Y )− S(Y ) + S(Y R)− S(YM1R) = S(M1) = n/2 + 1/2.
We used here the fact that S(YM1R) = S(Y R) = n, the fact that M1 is independent of Y , and the equality
S(M1) = n/2 + 1/2 we have already proven when analyzing the privacy loss in the proof of Claim 1.
We finally compute QICB(ΠIP ). For the second round, we have
|φ2〉 = 1
23n/2
∑
xy
|x〉X |y〉Y |xy〉R
∑
r∈{0,1}n
|r〉|(r ⊕ y) · x〉,
and thus
I(M2 : R|X) = S(M2X)− S(X)− S(XM2R) + S(XR)
= (n+ 1)− n− n+ (n+ n/2 + 1/2)
= n/2 + 3/2.
This concludes the proof of the second claim and hence of Theorem 2.
Remark 1. We can provide a tradeoff between the privacy loss of Alice and Bob in the following way: Alice
and Bob use their shared coins to pick a random t ∈ [n]. They apply Protocol ΠIP for the first t bits of their
inputs. Then, for the remaining n − t bits they switch roles and Bob sends the outcome to Alice. This new
protocol is correct, since the inner product of x, y is the XOR of the inner products of the smaller strings. Alice
leaks at most t/2 + 1/2 bits from the first invocation and 1 from the second one. Bob leaks at most 1 bit from
the first one and (n− t)/2 + 3/2 from the second one and hence n/2 + 4 in total. Note that allowing players
to use public coins does not change the information cost or the privacy loss of the protocols.
5 The privacy of Private Information Retrieval
In this section we construct a quantum protocol for Private Information Retrieval with polylogarithmic privacy
loss and polylogarithmic communication complexity, by describing a general method to convert a classical
scheme for Private Information Retrieval with ℓ > 1 servers into a quantum scheme with a single server.
Simulation of an ℓ-server classical scheme by a 1-server quantum scheme Consider a two-round
classical scheme ΠPIR, where a user interacts with ℓ > 1 servers that each possess a copy of the database and
are not allowed to interact with each other. We can describe such a scheme as in Fig. 2, where mq,ma, R ∈ N.
We assume that the distribution of queries that each server receives is uniform, and hence do not reveal any
information about the user’s input. This assumption is true for essentially all known classical protocols for
(information-theoretic) Private Information Retrieval, including the protocols described in [CGKS95, CGKS98]
that we will later use.
Protocol ΠPIR
1. The user picks uniformly at random r ∈ [R] that corresponds to a ℓ-tuple
of queries {qr1, ..., qrℓ} and asks query qrk ∈ {0, 1}mq to server i ∈ [ℓ].
2. Each server i, who received qri , sends his answer a
r
i ∈ {0, 1}ma, to the
user.
Figure 2: General form of a 2-round ℓ-server classical protocol for Private Information Retrieval.
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Let us now describe a quantum protocol QPIR that simulates the classical protocol ΠPIR, but with a
single server. The server and the user use ℓ query registers Q1, . . . , Qℓ of size mq each and ℓ answer reg-
isters Ans1, . . . ,Ansℓ of size ma each. Moreover the user also holds a private register Q of size ℓ · mq to
keep a copy of the queries. The protocol is given in Fig. 3, where we use the notations |ar[i−1]〉Ans[i−1] :=
|ar1〉Ans1 . . . |ari−1〉Ansi−1 and |0〉Ans[i,ℓ] := |0〉Ansi . . . |0〉Ansℓ .
Protocol QPIR
1. The user prepares the pure state
|φ1〉 := 1√
R
∑
r
|qr1 . . . qrℓ 〉Q|qr1〉Q1 . . . |qrℓ 〉Qℓ |0〉Ans1 . . . |0〉Ansk .
2. The user and the server iterate for i = 1 to ℓ :
• at each odd round 2i− 1 the user holds the whole (pure) state
|φ2i−1〉 := 1√
R
∑
r
|qr1 . . . qrℓ 〉Q|qr1〉Q1 . . . |qrℓ 〉Qℓ |ar[i−1]〉Ans[i−1] |0〉Ans[i,ℓ]
and sends registers (Qi,Ansi) to the server ;
• at each round 2i, the server holds (Qi,Ansi). He reads the query,
writes the answer in the Ansi register and sends the two registers to
the user.
Figure 3: Quantum protocol simulating ΠPIR with one server.
This protocol indeed simulates the classical protocol ΠPIR: at the end of the protocol, the user holds
|φ2k〉 = 1√
R
∑
r
|qr1 . . . qrℓ 〉Q|qr1〉Q1 . . . |qrℓ 〉Qℓ |ar[ℓ]〉Ans[ℓ]
and by measuring in the computational basis, he gets a uniformly random ℓ-tuple of queries and their answers,
hence he has the same success probability as the user in the classical scheme. The communication complexity
of Protocol QPIR is 2ℓ(ma +mq) qubits. We now describe its privacy.
Theorem 3. For the above protocol ΠPIR under uniform distribution of inputs, we have
LS(ΠPIR) = O(ℓ(ma +mq)) , LU (ΠPIR) = 0,
SICS(ΠPIR) = O(ℓ(ma +mq)) , SICU (ΠPIR) = Ω(log(n)),
QICS(ΠPIR) = O(ℓ(ma +mq)) , QICU (ΠPIR) = Ω(log(n)),
where the queries and answers are in {0, 1}mq and {0, 1}ma.
Proof. The first statement is obvious since in ΠPIR the total communication is 2ℓ(ma + mq) and hence
LS(ΠPIR), SICS(ΠPIR), QICS(ΠPIR) are O(ℓ(ma +mq)).
As for the privacy of the user, note that each message independently does not leak any information about
the user’s input, since the quantum message is exactly the same distribution over classical queries that each
server receives in the classical scheme, which we know is perfectly private. Moreover, in an honest execution,
the server does not keep anything in his workspace, since otherwise the state Alice has in the followinf round
will not be the prescribed pure state, and hence the privacy loss is 0.
Now, for SICU (ΠPIR) (and hence for QICU (ΠPIR)) we know from Theorem 3.2 in [JRS09] that, when
the parties are allowed to run the protocol with superpositions of their inputs, if the user leaks at most b bits
about his input, then the server has to leak at least Ω(n/2O(b)) bits about his database, or equivalently, if the
server leaks at most t bits about the database, then the user must leak at least Ω(log(n/t)) bits about his
input. Since in our scheme the communication is bounded by polylog(n), we obtain that the user has to leak
at least Ω(log(n)) about his input.
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Application: a quantum protocol for PIR with polylogarithmic privacy loss We consider the
classical scheme proposed in [CGKS95, CGKS98].
Lemma 1 (See Corollary 4 in [CGKS95]). There are (classical) private information retrieval schemes for
1
2 · (log2 n + log2 log2 n) + 1 servers, each holding n bits of data, so that the communication complexity is
1
2 · (1 + o(1)) · log22 n · log2 log2(2n).
By converting the classical protocol of Lemma 1 into a one-server quantum protocol by the above construc-
tion, and applying Theorem 3, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1. There exists a one-server quantum protocol for Private Information Retrieval, with communi-
cation complexity O(log2(n) · log log(n)), such that:
• the user leaks no information ;
• the server leaks O(polylog(n)) information.
6 Logarithmic scheme for PIR with prior entanglement
We now study one-server quantum private information retrieval in the same setting as in the previous section,
but allowing prior entanglement between the server and the user, and construct a protocol with privacy loss
and communication complexity O(log(n)). For simplicity we will assume in this section that n = 2ℓ, and
write the user’s input using its binary representation as i = i1i2 . . . iℓ, where i1, . . . , iℓ are bits such that
i = 1 +
∑ℓ
k=1 ik2
ℓ−k. The case where n is not a power of two can be dealt in a similar way, or simply by
adding zeros to the database in order to obtain a size that is a power of two.
For convenience we introduce the following notation.
Definition 6. Let s be any positive integer, and z be any binary string of length 2s. Define z[0] and
z[1] as the first and second halves of the string z, respectively. For any k ∈ {2, . . . , s} and any k bits
j1, . . . , jk, let z[j1, . . . , jk] be the binary string of length 2
s−k defined by the recurrence relation z[j1, . . . , jk] =
(z[j1, . . . , jk−1])[jk].
Let us consider an example to illustrate this definition: if s = 3 and z = 10100110, then z[0] = 1010,
z[1] = 0110, z[0, 0] = 10, z[0, 1] = 10, z[1, 0] = 01, z[1, 1] = 10 and, for instance, z[0, 0, 0] = 1 or z[1, 0, 1] = 0.
Note that, with these definitions, the bit xi that the user wants to output in a protocol for Private Information
Retrieval is x[i1, . . . , iℓ].
Our protocol will use, besides the two registers containing the inputs, the following quantum registers:
• ℓ quantum registers R1, . . . , Rℓ where Rk is a register of 2ℓ−k qubits for k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ};
• ℓ quantum registers R′1, . . . , R′ℓ where R′k is a register of 2ℓ−k qubits for k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ};
• two one-qubit quantum registers Q0 and Q1.
Define the unitary operator V1 acting on (R1, Q0, Q1) as follows:
V1 (|z〉R1 |a〉Q0 |b〉Q1) = |z〉R1 |a⊕ z · x[0]〉Q0 |b⊕ z · x[1]〉Q1
for any string z ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ−1 and any bits a, b ∈ {0, 1}. For any integer k ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}, we define the unitary
operator Vk acting on (Rk−1, Rk, Q0, Q1) as follows:
Vk
(|y〉Rk−1 |z〉Rk |a〉Q0 |b〉Q1
)
= |y〉Rk−1 |z〉Rk |a⊕ z · y[0]〉Q0 |b⊕ z · y[1]〉Q1
for any strings y ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ−k+1, z ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ−k and any bits a, b ∈ {0, 1}.
For any integer k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, define the state
|Φk〉(Rk,R′k) =
1√
22ℓ−k
∑
z∈{0,1}2ℓ−k
|z〉Rk |z〉R′k .
We assume that the server and the user initially share the quantum state
|Φ1〉(R1,R′1) ⊗ |Φ2〉(R2,R′2) ⊗ · · · ⊗ |Φℓ〉(Rℓ,R′ℓ) ⊗ |0〉Q0 |0〉Q1 ,
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Protocol PPIR
1. For k from 1 to ℓ, the server and the user do the following:
(a) The server applies Vk, and then sends Registers Q0 and Q1 to the
user;
(b) The user applies the Pauli gate Z over Register Qik and sends back
Registers Q0 and Q1 to the server;
(c) The server applies Vk, and applies a Hadamard transform on each
of the 2ℓ−k qubits in Register Rk;
(d) The user applies a Hadamard transform on each of the 2ℓ−k qubits
in Register R′k.
2. The server sends Register Rℓ to the user.
Figure 4: Quantum protocol for private information retrieval with prior entanglement.
where R1, . . . , Rℓ, Q0, Q1 are owned by the server and R
′
1, . . . , R
′
ℓ are owned by the user. Our quantum protocol
is given in Fig. 4.
We analyze the correctness, the complexity and the privacy of Protocol PPIR in the Appendix, and prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 4. The protocol PPIR for input size n = 2ℓ has communication complexity 4 log(n) + 1 qubits and
correctly computes the index function. Moreover, under uniform distribution of inputs, we have
LS(PPIR) ≤ 2 log(n) + 1 , LU (PPIR) = 0,
SICS(PPIR) ≤ 2 log(n) + 1 , SICU (PPIR) = Ω(log(n)),
QICS(PPIR) ≤ 2 log(n) + 1 , QICU (PPIR) = Ω(log(n)).
The proof relies on the following lemma, which can be easily shown by recursion on k.
Lemma 2. Assume that Protocol PPIR is applied when the server’s input is x ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ and the user’s input
is i ∈ {0, 1}ℓ. Then, at the end of the k-th iteration of the loop in Step 1, the state of the quantum system is
(omitting a global normalization factor)

 ∑
y1,...,yk
(
|y1〉R1 |x[i1]⊕ y1〉R′1⊗
k⊗
j=2
|yj〉Rj |yj−1[ij ]⊕ yj〉R′j
)⊗|0〉Q0|0〉Q1⊗


ℓ⊗
j=k+1
|Φj〉(Rj ,R′j)

,
where the sum is over all strings y1 ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ−1, . . . , yk ∈ {0, 1}2ℓ−k.
Proof of Theorem 4. Since each iteration of the loop in Step 1 uses four qubits of communication, and one
additional qubit is used at Step 2, the overall communication complexity is 4ℓ+ 1.
Next, we show that this protocol correctly computes the index function, i.e., the user can output xi. From
Lemma 2, the state of the quantum system at the end of Protocol PPIR is (omitting a global normalization
factor) ∑
y1,...,yℓ
|y1〉R1 |x[i1]⊕ y1〉R′1 |y2〉R2 |y1[i2]⊕ y2〉R′2 · · · |yℓ〉Rℓ |yℓ−1[iℓ]⊕ yℓ〉R′ℓ |0〉Q0 |0〉Q1 ,
where the server owns Registers R1, . . . , Rℓ−1, Q0, Q1, and the user owns Register Rℓ and Registers R′1, . . . , R
′
ℓ.
If the server and the user measure all their registers, the user obtains strings aℓ, b1, . . . , bℓ such that


aℓ = yℓ,
b1 = x[i1]⊕ y1,
b2 = y1[i2]⊕ y2,
...
...
...
bℓ = yℓ−1[iℓ]⊕ yℓ,
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for some strings y1, . . . , yℓ corresponding to the server’s measurement outcomes. Note that
x[i1, i2, . . . , iℓ] = b
1[i2, . . . , iℓ]⊕ b2[i3, . . . , iℓ]⊕ · · · ⊕ bℓ−1[iℓ]⊕ bℓ ⊕ aℓ,
which means that the user can recover xi = x[i1, i2, . . . , iℓ] from his measurement outcomes.
The upper bounds on LS(PPIR), SICS(PPIR) and QICS(PPIR) follow from the observation that the total
length of the messages received by the user is 2ℓ + 1. The lower bounds on SICU (PPIR) and QICU (PPIR)
follow from the same argument (based on [JRS09]) as in Theorem 3.
Finally, let us prove that LU (PPIR) = 0, by showing that the server’s state just after receiving the message
from the user during the k-th iteration of Step 1 of Protocol PPIR is independent of i, for each k ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
In the case k = 1, the state of the registers owned by the server just after receiving the message from the user
is, omitting a global normalization factor,

 ∑
z∈{0,1}2ℓ−1
|Ψ(z)〉〈Ψ(z)|

⊗


ℓ⊗
j=2
∑
z∈{0,1}2ℓ−j
|z〉Rj 〈z|Rj

,
where |Ψ(z)〉 = (−1)x[i1]·z|z〉R1 |x[0] · z〉Q0 |x[1] · z〉Q1 . Since
|Ψ(z)〉〈Ψ(z)| = |z〉R1 |x[0] · z〉Q0 |x[1] · z〉Q1〈z|R1〈x[0] · z|Q0〈x[1] · z|Q1
is independent of i, the above state is also independent of i. For the case k ≥ 2, by using Lemma 2, the state
of the registers owned by the server just after receiving the k-th message from the user is, omitting a global
normalization factor,

 ∑
y1,...,yk−1
∑
z∈{0,1}2ℓ−k
|Ψx(y1, . . . , yk−1, z)〉〈Ψx(y1, . . . , yk−1, z)|

⊗


ℓ⊗
j=k+1
∑
z∈{0,1}2ℓ−j
|z〉Rj 〈z|Rj

,
where
|Ψx(y1, . . . , yk−1, z)〉 = (−1)y
k−1[ik]·z|y1〉R1 · · · |yk−1〉Rk−1 |z〉Rk |yk−1[0] · z〉Q0 |yk−1[1] · z〉Q1 ,
and is again independent of i.
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